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Abstract
Background: Despite considerable institutional experimentation at national and international levels in response to
calls for global health security reform, there is little research on organisational models that address outbreak
preparedness and response. Created in the aftermath of the 2013–16 West African Ebola epidemic, the United
Kingdom’s Public Health Rapid Support Team (UK-PHRST) was designed to address critical gaps in outbreak
response illuminated during the epidemic, while leveraging existing UK institutional strengths. The partnership
between the government agency, Public Health England, and an academic consortium, led by the London School
of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, seeks to integrate outbreak response, operational research and capacity building.
We explored the design, establishment and early experiences of the UK-PHRST as one of the first bodies of its kind
globally, paying particular attention to governance decisions which enabled them to address their complex mission.
Methods: We conducted a qualitative case study using 19 in-depth interviews with individuals knowledgeable
about the team’s design and implementation, review of organisational documents, and observations of meetings to
analyse the UK-PHRST’s creation, establishment and initial 2 years of operations.
Results: According to key informants, adopting a triple mandate (response, research and capacity building)
established the team as novel in the global epidemic response architecture. Key governance decisions recognised
as vital to the model included: structuring the team as a government-academic collaboration which leveraged
long-term and complementary UK investments in public health and the higher education sector; adopting a more
complex, dual reporting and funding structure to maintain an ethos of institutional balance between lead
organisations; supporting a multidisciplinary team of experts to respond early in outbreaks for optimal impact;
prioritising and funding epidemic research to influence response policy and practice; and ensuring the team’s
activities reinforced the existing global health architecture.
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Conclusion: The UK-PHRST aims to enhance global outbreak response using an innovative and integrated model
that capitalises on institutional strengths of the partnership. Insights suggest that despite adding complexity,
integrating operational research through the government-academic collaboration contributed significant
advantages. This promising model could be adopted and adapted by countries seeking to build similar outbreak
response and research capacities.
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Background
The Coronavirus-19 (COVID-19) pandemic is a stark re-
minder of how vulnerable the world is to pandemics and
underscores the importance of investing in outbreak
preparedness and response capacity. In recent years, a
series of infectious disease threats have led to declara-
tions of Public Health Emergencies of International
Concern (PHEIC), and prompted reflection on how glo-
bal health structures can best be designed to respond to
epidemics [1]. The 2002–04 Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) pandemic, for example, prompted
adoption of the 2005 International Health Regulations
(IHR 2005) which state that all member states should
maintain capacities to prevent, detect and respond to
public health emergencies [2]. Prior to 2012, however,
few countries were fully compliant [3, 4]. The scale of
the West African Ebola epidemic in 2013–16, again
highlighted the need to reform global health governance
to address limitations of the global health community to
both respond to, and conduct essential research in, com-
plex outbreaks [5]. COVID-19, the largest of recent
PHEICs, has uncovered several additional important
issues. Theses include; tensions around capacity for
domestic responses in high income countries versus
the need for international assistance in low- and mid-
dle- income countries (LMICs); the importance
and relevance of contextualised and localised response
interventions; and the responsibilities of global bodies
to ensure equitable access to the outputs of research
and innovation, such as diagnostics, vaccines and
treatments, among others [6, 7].
Despite considerable institutional experimentation and
reform at the national and international levels to re-
spond to calls for global health governance reform [1, 8–
12], there is little research on organizational models that
address epidemic preparedness and response. This paper
contributes empirical material on the design, evolution
and implementation of one such organization, the
United Kingdom’s Public Health Rapid Support Team
(UK-PHRST). Created in the aftermath of the response
to the 2013–16 West African Ebola epidemic, the UK-
PHRST was designed to address critical gaps in global
outbreak response illuminated during the UK’s experi-
ence of responding to the Ebola epidemic in Sierra
Leone, and to leverage cross-sectorial institutional
strengths present in the UK.
The global health response to the 2013–16 West African
Ebola epidemic
The West African Ebola outbreak prompted an immense
domestic and international response. While underlying
political, social, and cultural factors within these coun-
tries enabled disease spread, weak health systems, poor
domestic outbreak preparedness and a delayed inter-
national response were also responsible [1, 5, 10]. The
World Health Organization (WHO) was criticised for its
failure to acknowledge the potential severity of the out-
break and to coordinate an effective early international
response [13]. Moreover, many of the world’s wealthiest
nations were charged with ignoring the crisis until it dir-
ectly threatened their own countries [13].
International deployment of technical staff was largely
coordinated through the Global Outbreak Alert and
Response Network (GOARN), a global network com-
prised of over 260 technical institutions and coordi-
nated by an operational support team based at the
WHO Headquarters, Geneva [14]. An estimated 2,500
international personnel were deployed from 40 orga-
nisations and 58 foreign governmental and non-
governmental emergency medical teams from China,
Cuba, the Africa Union, the United States, the UK
and elsewhere [13, 15]. They worked alongside na-
tional medical and public health staff, and foreign and
national military personnel, within Ministry of Health
coordinated Incident Management Systems and treat-
ment centres in the affected countries [3, 4].
Among foreign government donors, support for re-
sponses in the three most-affected countries was divided
along historic colonial lines, enabling donors to build on
existing partnerships and foreign relations infrastructure,
with the UK taking the lead in Sierra Leone, the United
States in Liberia, and France in Guinea [16]. In Sierra
Leone, the UK’s leading role elicited coordination and
contributions across UK government departments, in-
cluding the Department for International Development
(DFID) [now the Foreign, Commonwealth & Develop-
ment Office (FCDO)], Public Health England (PHE), and
the British military, as well as universities, and the
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private and civil society sectors, many of whom had
long-standing ties to the country [15, 17].
The UK’s public health response in Sierra Leone was
coordinated by the governmental agency PHE [15]. To
staff the response on the ground, PHE seconded experts
in public health, epidemiology, virology, clinical medi-
cine and social sciences from government agencies and
universities [15, 18]. Key UK organisations who deployed
staff included the UK government’s Emergency Medical
Team (UK-EMT), which typically responded to humani-
tarian crises; UK-Med, which supported deployment of
National Health Service (NHS) clinical staff from the UK
International Emergency Trauma and Medical Registers;
Oxford University; King’s College London (KCL); and
the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine
(LSHTM). Deployments tended to be channelled
through organisations with an existing presence on the
ground, such as the KCL Sierra Leone Partnership, and
the UK sections of Save the Children and Médecins Sans
Frontiers (MSF) and other non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) [15, 19]. This enabled the UK response to
build on existing infrastructure while facilitating service
provision and training of national staff in surveillance,
diagnosis and clinical management of Ebola cases [15,
19]. PHE also established laboratory capacity in Sierra
Leone [20] and British military personnel contributed to
building and staffing six Ebola treatment centres, includ-
ing one dedicated to treating healthcare professionals, in
addition to supporting overall coordination, logistics and
training of health care workers [15, 16].
During the Ebola epidemic, UK institutions were also
highly engaged in both operational research and research
and development (R&D) of epidemic tools and technolo-
gies. Operational research findings drawing on mathem-
atical modelling, epidemiological and anthropological
research, for example, have been recognised as providing
evidence that was pivotal for decision-makers to guide
Ebola response policies, planning and intervention de-
sign in real-time [21–23]. UK partners also ran clinical
trials with West African researchers, humanitarian agen-
cies and the private sector to develop diagnostics, treat-
ments and vaccines [15, 24]. While novel ways of
conducting clinical research were devised, the UK, simi-
lar to most countries involved in the response, conceded
they were unprepared to conduct clinical trials when the
epidemic began [25, 26]. By the time most trials were
implemented, numbers of positive cases had significantly
reduced and clinical endpoints could not be met [15].
Examples include the PHE Defence Science and Tech-
nology Laboratory’s rapid diagnostic test for Ebola,
which was developed, manufactured and trialled in
Sierra Leone, but never operationalised [25, 26] and the
US National Institute for Health trial of the immuno-
therapy ZMapp, which was stopped before reaching a
definitive result [27]. This collective failure was seen as a
missed opportunity to develop medical tools and tech-
nologies, that cost lives, compromised future responses
and emphasised the need for advance preparation for fu-
ture outbreaks [25, 26, 28].
Redesigning the global health architecture post-Ebola
At a global level, widespread criticism of WHO’s role of
the Ebola outbreak in a number of high-profile reports,
influenced subsequent reforms of the global epidemic
response architecture [1, 8–12]. Consensus recommen-
dations included consolidating and strengthening WHO
emergency and outbreak response activities, strengthen-
ing global disease surveillance and implementation of
IHR core capacities, strengthening national health sys-
tems, and enhancing epidemic research and develop-
ment [1, 10]. Actions taken since then have included the
launch of the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) in
2014, which outlines specific actions that countries can
take to meet IHR requirements [29] and development of
a WHO Joint External Evaluation (JEE) tool in 2016 to
facilitate collaborative assessment of countries’ IHR cap-
acities [28, 30]. In 2016, the WHO Health Emergencies
Programme (WHE) was created to enhance coordination
and operational response capacity during health crises
[31–33]. In parallel, the WHO Global Health Emergency
Workforce, was established to facilitate rapid deploy-
ment of national and non-governmental EMTs to emer-
gencies [33]. At regional level, the Africa Centers for
Disease Control (Africa CDC) was established as a spe-
cialized public health institution of the African Union to
strengthen the capacity of members states for infectious
disease preparedness and response [34].
Encouraging investment has been made in research
too. This includes development of the WHO Research
and Development Blueprint, a global strategy and pre-
paredness plan for rapid activation of research and de-
velopment during epidemics, particularly for diagnostics,
vaccines and treatments [28, 35], creation of a taskforce
for operational research during outbreaks by GOARN
and several public–private partnerships to foster re-
search and development on infectious diseases [28, 36].
In addition, a variety of university-led knowledge hubs
have been established to feed academic insight into epi-
demic decision-making [37].
In this study, we explore the creation of the UK-PHRS
T in the post-Ebola UK and global health policy context
and examine early experiences of how the team imple-
mented its mission as one of the first bodies of its kind.
We pay particular attention to the governance decisions
the UK-PHRST made which enabled them to address
the complex mission. This study contributes qualitative
empirical observations on the design, evolution and im-
plementation of an integrated and innovative model for
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outbreak preparedness and response, which could in-




The research took place in 2017–18, during Years 2 and
3 of the five-year UK-PHRST programme of work.
When data collection began in September 2017, the UK-
PHRST was transitioning from a protracted interim
stage to the permanent phase of the project.
Sampling
This study employed an embedded research approach
using in-depth interviews, review of key documents and
observation of meetings to gather data. Purposive sam-
pling [38] was used to recruit participants knowledgeable
on the research objectives. Nineteen in-depth semi
structured interviews were conducted with individuals
involved in the conceptualisation and establishment of
the partnership [3], senior management team (SMT) [3],
core management and core deployable team (CDT) in-
volved in both the interim and permanent phase [5],
representatives of key external stakeholders – Depart-
ment of Health (DH), National Institute for Health Re-
search (NIHR), DFID and GOARN [4] as well as
members of the academic steering committee (ASC) and
academic consortium [4].
Data collection and analysis
In-depth interviews followed semi-structured interview
guides (see Additional File 1: Qualitative Interview
Guides) and were digitally recorded before transcription
and analysis. An iterative process was applied whereby
topic guides were edited following each interview to in-
clude questions on emerging themes in subsequent in-
terviews. Key documents were reviewed and staff
meetings and an induction day were attended to gain a
deeper understanding of organisational objectives and
policies. Framework analysis [39] was used to analyse
data using NVivo 11 [40]. Despite the limited numbers
of interviews conducted [19] saturation was reached on
several key themes, which we outline below.
Ethics
The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
Observational / Interventions Research Ethics Commit-
tee reviewed and approved this research in September
2017, review reference No:14329 /RR/8906. All partici-
pants were informed of the study aims and objectives
using a participant information sheet and all signed
consent forms, including their chosen level of
confidentiality.
Results
Designing the UK-PHRST within the UK policy context
The concept for the UK-PHRST can be traced to the
second half of 2014, when institutions across the UK
were ramping up activities in Sierra Leone in response
to WHO’s August declaration that the Ebola epidemic
had become a PHEIC. This was complemented by sub-
stantial political and scientific activity within the UK, in-
cluding activation of the independent Scientific Advisory
Group for Emergencies (SAGE) to channel scientific ad-
vice to the government emergency response committee
[25, 26] and several informal meetings between Govern-
ment departments and the university, civil society and
private sectors. The idea for a rapid response team that
could also conduct research emerged during discussions
between LSHTM academics and staff of PHE and DH.
The concept was championed by the UK’s Chief Medical
Officer (CMO) and other advocates within DH, PHE,
and the Prime Minister’s Office. The CMO proposed
that a “rapid response force” like the UK-PHRST could
strengthen PHE’s international public health functions
[25, 26] and the team featured as a key deliverable of the
PHE global health strategy delivery plan in January 2015
[41]. With the Ebola epidemic largely under control by
mid-2015, the UK’s leadership and collective efforts were
commended, and government began to reflect and ad-
dress lessons learned [25]. Alongside other major com-
mitments for infectious diseases research funding,
including the substantial Ross fund, the UK-PHRST was
formally announced at the G7 Summit in June 2015 by
the UK’s Prime Minister [42, 43].
At the time, the UK-PHRST gained high-level appeal
for a number of politically expedient reasons. Firstly, it
married global health concerns with threats to domestic
security. The overall integrated mission of the UK-PHRS
T, which was envisioned as the route to achieving the
long-term outcomes and impact, was certainly outwardly
focused on LMIC’s and humanitarian settings, to
“prevent outbreaks from becoming public health
emergencies, reduce morbidity and mortality, and
ultimately make the world safer from outbreaks of
infectious diseases” [44] (p.6).
Nevertheless, early team strategy documents emphasised
the health security benefits to the UK:
“In addition to the benefits to stakeholders overseas,
the UK-PHRST will help protect the UK population
through the development of greater capacity to pre-
vent, detect and respond to health threats inter-
nationally that might directly or indirectly affect the
UK, resulting in potential health, economic or social
harm.” [44] (p.3).
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The UK National Health Service (NHS) was also framed
as better protected with a dedicated team of experts
available to deploy to these epidemics, avoiding the com-
plex and costly processes involved in ‘backfilling’ special-
ists from their day jobs [44]. Moreover, these experts
would be funded by overseas aid money, meaning that
the UK-PHRST would not be competing with the NHS
for budget. While one DH representative acknowledged
that any health project with an overseas focus was vul-
nerable to public criticism because:
“the Daily Mail and the Daily Mirror [UK newspa-
pers] are obsessed with the aid budget”
they also reasoned that spending on international out-
break responses was more easily justified, saying:
“everyone can see that they [the team] go, they do.
‘Yay, the UK's got someone going off to deal with
plague!’ ... that's an easier story to tell. UK expertise
going out to help ... [for] the most paternalistic [rea-
sons], that fits with their model of what the UK
does”.
Secondly, research and innovation are important
economies in the UK which are also embedded in the
ways the Government work [44]. Giving the UK-
PHRST a mandate to do research, therefore, made
sense to stakeholders as it fitted with UK Government
ideology of evidence-based interventions, while also
addressing critical gaps experienced during the Ebola
epidemic [25]. Having previously set up the NIHR,
the UK’s CMO advocated for a strong academic com-
ponent in this model, which laid the groundwork for
the novel government-academic partnership.
“It's because the CMO wanted an academic focus
[...] it wasn't just about the doing, it was also about
the research to improve the doing and then building
on the capacity building stuff. The CMO wanted it
to be rigorously academic. So, they [PHE] had to
have an academic partner.” (SMT member involved
in conceptualisation).
Thirdly, the UK-PHRST’s concept furthermore con-
tributed to a UK government strategy to pursue glo-
bal impact through diffusing ODA spending across
more domestic government departments and the
higher education sector. Whilst being mindful that
ODA funding exists to bring benefits to LMICs and
helps grow international collaborations on a principle
of equity, it also contributes to positioning UK insti-
tutions as leaders in the response to global challenges
[45]. Many informants believed that the UK
experiences in the Sierra Leone response should be
harnessed in a project like the UK-PHRST, as de-
scribed by a DH representative.
“Because of the Ebola stuff, because we were so heav-
ily involved in it, we have a global reputation for this
sort of skill set. And leadership. . . we have a reputa-
tion. There is an expectation upon us. . . there is an
assumption that the UK will engage”
With the UK-PHRST organised to be ODA-funded,
increased experience, technical capacity, and leader-
ship skills of UK personnel was seen as a key selling
point by authors of UK-PHRST strategy documents,
which would also maximise synergy and effectiveness
of other UK aid investments, including support to
WHO [44].
For UK-PHRST team members and individuals closely
involved in its set-up, however, the most important ra-
tionale for the team was its novel contribution to the
global epidemic response architecture. With few govern-
ments in the Global North developing rapid response
teams with specialist skills for epidemics (as opposed to
wider skills for humanitarian emergencies, including nat-
ural disasters) and none explicitly incorporating a re-
search component, they commonly described the UK
model as “innovative”, “pioneering” and “pathfinding”.
Team members furthermore hoped their model would
catch-on in this expanding field, as described by this
SMT member:
“I think there’s a sort of initiative to have more of
these teams set up and running [...]. I think we’re at
the forefront of that wave, so I think we’re path-
finders to some extent. I hope that others will be [...]
looking to us as an example and learning from what
we’ve done.”
Implementing the UK’s integrated model for outbreak
response
The UK-PHRST team was considered a key component
of UK cross-governmental global health security efforts,
and was also expected to bridge key academic partners
across the UK, as well as serve as an integral partner to
the international community, especially WHO and
GOARN, and other developing Rapid Response Teams
[44]. Despite high-level enthusiasm to develop a national
response team that combined response and research,
however, the bureaucratic processes involved to get the
UK-PHRST off the ground meant the team took 1.5
years to establish, and 3 years to fully operationalise.
Meanwhile several more epidemics were detected glo-
bally, including the Zika epidemic, which was declared a
PHEIC in February 2016. To document the journey from
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conceptualisation through to operationalisation of the
team, we compiled a timeline of events presented in
Fig. 1.
Although prior to Ebola, PHE had focussed on control-
ling outbreaks in the UK and acknowledged that it was
not as well equipped to respond internationally to emer-
gencies, they were the de facto government agency [25,
26]. LSHTM academics, who had been key members of
the SAGE committee advising on government policy in Si-
erra Leone and had been involved in early discussions
with Government on establishing a rapid response team,
were obvious contenders. Building on their shared experi-
ences in West Africa, Oxford University and KCL joined
forces with LSHTM to form an academic consortium,
contributing their expertise on clinical research and men-
tal health towards a combined application. Following an
external competitive process managed by NIHR, LSHTM
and their partners were successful in January 2016, and
subsequently merged their proposals with PHE. This dis-
jointed process felt inefficient to observers and resulted in
a year-long delay, as described by an ASC member in-
volved in the UK-PHRST’s conceptualisation.
“Well, PHE were obviously going to win it, right? So I
don’t see any point of making PHE write an
application separately [...]. I thought a more sensible
thing to do would be to say to PHE . . . you should
work with the shortlisted applicants to help them
write a proposal that looks good [...]. It didn’t make
any sense.”
The long set-up period was compounded by further
delays. While funding was released in April 2016,
contracts were only signed in July and the official
launch did not take place until November 2016. An
interim period began in September 2016 with an ad-
ministrative team and core deployable staff, whilst a
full-time director and the permanent team were be-
ing recruited. Following a protracted recruitment
process for the Director’s position, the post was oc-
cupied in April 2017 and work began on the stra-
tegic framework to guide the team’s long-term
strategy. Recruitment of the core deployable team
ran from June–September 2017 so the interim period
was extended to cover this time. According to UK-
PHRST personnel, the interim phase was charac-
terised by substantial uncertainty and an unwilling-
ness of the institutions to invest in team members as
it was unclear if they would be hired as permanent
staff.
Fig. 1 Timeline of events in the conceptualisation and establishment of the UK-PHRST. CMO = Chief Medical Officer, GOARN = Global outbreak
alert and response network, PHE = Public Health England, LSHTM = London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, UK-PHRST = UK Public
Health Rapid Support Team, LSHTM-OX-KC = Academic consortium, ORP = Operational Research project. The deployments bubble represents the
seven deployments which took place in year 2 from April 2017 to Feb 2018. Each deployment shows country of deployment, request type
(GOARN, Bilateral or UK-EMT), whether an operational research project (ORP) took place during the response and the dates of the deployment.
The initial three deployments took place during the interim phase of the project
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“During the interim phase it very much felt like a
place holder [...] it felt like we had been put there be-
cause there was a rush to get the team in place and
we needed to tick a box and tell Department of
Health and the Government this rapid deployable
team was there, ready to go.” (CDT member)
The multi-disciplinary CDT consisted of three epide-
miologists, two clinical researchers, a social scientist,
two microbiologists, a data manager and analyst, an in-
fection prevention and control expert and a logistician
as well as the Director. A core management team sup-
ported the administrative aspects and the six-member
senior management team consisted of the Director, Dep-
uty Directors from PHE and LSHTM, the Microbiology
Lead, a Senior Programme Manager at PHE, and a
Programme Manager for LSHTM.
The governance and funding structures of the partner-
ship split reporting responsibilities equally between the
two key partner organisations. An annual lump sum was
issued from the Treasury to DH for PHE, while for
LSHTM, the team’s budget was managed as a research
grant overseen by NIHR. Reporting on operational as-
pects of the grant followed the same DH-PHE and
NIHR-LSHTM parallel arrangement. Ultimately, how-
ever, the UK-PHRST Director was accountable to the
PHE Medical Director for delivery against the strategy
and annual plans. PHE’s Medical Director then reported
all UK-PHRST spending to DH, which was, in turn, ac-
countable to the Treasury for the total amount, ensuring
compliance to ODA funding rules. Because of the com-
plicated governance structures and the fact that the
programme was still in the early stage of operationalisa-
tion, reporting requirements felt cumbersome and com-
plex for many members of the SMT with what was
described as a three-step process.
“It makes it more complicated because we have to
report UK-PHRST activities to two different bodies
which are interested in different things, and then
those reports need to be stitched together so that
there is a single report that goes back to DH [...]
There’s certainly some duplication of work.”
There was a perception by some PHE representatives
that this split in funding added unnecessary compli-
cations and that it would have been more efficient if
all funding had been channelled through PHE, who
could then sub-contract LSHTM. Moreover, the in-
flexible nature of annual ODA funding was seen as a
challenge both for implementing research and man-
aging the unpredictable nature of outbreak response,
as described by one individual involved in the
conceptualisation.
“It comes with all sorts of dire restrictions on what
you can and can't do and how you report it, way,
way beyond normal government funding. . . Because
ODA funding is essentially David Cameron's [the
UK Prime Minister’s at the time] promise to spend a
certain proportion of GDP on international develop-
ment, which became a legal requirement, therefore
the ODA money has to be spent when it's given to
you. And there's no flexibility by not spending it, you
get heavily criticised by the Treasury if you don't
spend it. 'Cause if you don't spend it, it means the
UK doesn't meet its legal obligations under the act.”
While the dual funding mechanism added complexity,
it was nevertheless perceived as essential to maintaining
organisational balance, as described by a member of the
SMT.
“I think if you ever look at sort of successful partner-
ships, particularly between different institutions in
different places, if you think about international col-
laborations, if all the money goes through one party
then they have all the power. And it’s not an equal
relationship.”
Despite the challenges and unanticipated delays en-
countered, the added value of the government-academic
partnership was recognised by all involved as a signifi-
cant collaborative advantage.
“I think if this is simply something that is run out of
a ministry and is entirely a civil-service driven thing,
then I don’t think it would be nearly as exciting and
viable.” (SMT member)
The role of the UK-PHRST in rapid outbreak response
Team members and observers believed the key strength
of the UK-PHRST was its model of a standing, core
team of experts who could deploy rapidly early in the
outbreak to influence response activities and set up re-
search early on in epidemics. This model also played to
the team’s strengths, as described by one CDT member.
“There are very few teams like us in the world, and
so we need to use the fact that we are a small team
of pretty experienced individuals. The best use of
that skills is going very early. When you go late into
an outbreak ... The difference you can make when
you're part of a massive WHO operation is much
less, and your ability to influence the course and the
direction is much less.”
Delays in establishing the permanent team meant that
no deployments or research took place in year 1, and the
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year-1 budget went largely unspent. The first deploy-
ment took place in April 2017 and by April 2018, the
team had deployed seven times, once bilaterally, once
with the UK-Emergency Medical Team (UK-EMT)
and five times through WHO’s GOARN (Fig. 1).
Deployment of the team to LMIC’s, was contingent
upon receiving an official request for assistance from
one of three sources: 1.bilateral requests directly from
a national government, 2. indirect requests through
GOARN or WHO regional or country offices, and 3.
domestic requests to participate in UK humanitarian
responses abroad, such as those led by the UK Emer-
gency Medical Team (UK-EMT). With the UK-PHRS
T often described as a UK government ‘asset’, how-
ever, decisions surrounding the team’s deployment to
LMICs involved sometimes complex political choreog-
raphy, as acknowledged by one SMT member:
“We can’t go anywhere unless we’re invited to go.
Even if we are sitting on the sidelines and we’re see-
ing that an outbreak’s occurring, we think it’s im-
portant, and we could help there, we can’t go unless
we’re invited.” (SMT member).
Decisions surrounding the team’s deployments were
ultimately subject to a cross-government decision
protocol and ministerial approval, which included an
assessment of the UK’s relationship with the request-
ing government, and was subject to ODA-eligibility.
Informal communications through DH or UK-PHRST
channels were often the initial alarm which would ac-
tivate and inform a risk assessment of the public
health case for intervention, which the UK-PHRST
director would present to government ministers once
a request was formally made. This included resolving
potentially important political issues ‘behind’ multi-
lateral requests. For example, before the team de-
ployed to Ethiopia in 2017, according to a DH repre-
sentative, Ministers considered the deployment in
relation to the UK’s competition in concurrent elec-
tions for the Director General of the WHO and how
that could affect their international relationships.
“Tedros [the Ethiopian candidate] was competing
with David Nabarro, who was our candidate [...] We
didn't want to be seen to be going in [...] So, we al-
ways make sure there's a formal invite [...] so we
know it is the government, not just WHO, who's in-
vited us.”
Deployments were then expected to happen within 48
h of a positive Ministerial decision, which team members
saw as a significant advantage of the UK-PHRST over
other global outbreak response mechanisms, particularly
GOARN. Moreover, as described by a DH representa-
tive, the short-term nature of deployments (typically 4–
6 weeks long) was viewed as critical to the teams added
value, while more long-term response mechanisms, such
as through GOARN, were being activated.
“It's the business of having a standing team who
can drop everything and go, because the one thing
you can't do through GOARN, it's a process which
requires you to put names forward, everyone
thinks about it. They've got to backfill the posts.
So, technically, they (UK-PHRST) can drop every-
thing at 48-hour’s notice and off they go [...]So,
that gives them enormous flexibility”
The influence of the UK-PHRST abroad was also per-
ceived to be partly dependent on the mode through
which the team was deployed. Whereas bilateral deploy-
ments were experienced by team members as less bur-
eaucratic and more efficient, key to fulfilling the
mandate of rapid response, and research projects could
be set up more easily, deployments via WHO-GOARN
facilitated their contribution within the broader global
health context. Members of the team felt that deploying
to protracted outbreaks, such as to the Ethiopian cholera
outbreak in April 2017, was not the best use of their
capacities, while their contribution during acute emer-
gencies such as the mudslides in Sierra Leone in August
2017 [46] and plague outbreak in Madagascar later that
year, were considerably more meaningful. Despite the
preference of some team members for bilateral deploy-
ments, a member of the SMT reiterated the importance
of integrating with existing coordination mechanisms to
avoid contributing to response fragmentation, an im-
portant lesson from the West Africa Ebola outbreak [5,
10, 12]. Moreover, team members were not branded as
UK-PHRST when deployed through GOARN which was
highlighted as potential tension.
“There’s a delicate balance [...] we want the UK-
PHRST to fit into that global architecture, and not
be a part of a process causing confusion [...] versus
being seen to be a UK asset, and the UK can fly the
flag and show that they’re doing something globally.”
(SMT member)
Conducting operational research in outbreaks
The UK-PHRST envisaged operational research as their
most effective route to improving outbreak responses
[44]. Whereas research on outbreaks is often depriori-
tised, delayed or separated from the early response for
fear that it could detract public health resources, the ex-
plicit research component in the mandate meant that
the UK-PHRST could prioritise setting up operational
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research alongside outbreak response in the early stages
of an emergency. One individual involved in conceptua-
lising the UK-PHRST described the importance of this
for decision-making throughout an epidemic, based on
his observations during Ebola:
“I think it's important that we do research. But it's
unbelievable the low level of evidence that goes into
some of the decision making around these sort of
emergency settings. [...] Ebola is a brilliant example
of that. We treated nearly 30,000 cases of Ebola and
if you look at the death rate it improved over the
course of the outbreak from about 70, 80% in the
outset to about 50% towards the end... we don't
know why we improved the outcome. Because we
didn't collect enough data [...] I personally think
that's scandalous [...] we're the only one of the
[Rapid response teams] that have been set up that
does have a research component attached to it, an
explicit research component.”
The UK-PHRST research portfolio was divided into
three distinct components: research during outbreaks,
research in the immediate wake of outbreaks, and a
long-term research agenda to be conducted outside of
outbreaks. The research strategy was loosely organised
according to five main streams covering epidemiology
and population sciences, patient-centred research,
microbiology and laboratory sciences, social sciences
and community engagement, and mental health and
wellbeing, which capitalised on existing expertise and re-
search interests of scientists at the universities, many of
whom were involved in the Ebola response [44, 47]. The
research strategy also identified priority pathogens, such
as Ebola, Lassa Fever, Marburg and Vector borne dis-
eases, which aligned with the research strategies of other
groups, including WHO (R&D Blueprint), Coalition for
Epidemic Preparedness Initiative (CEPI) and the UK
Vaccine Initiative (UKVI). To ensure rigour, the team
set-up an academic steering committee (ASC) made up
of experts from participating UK-PHRST institutions to
evaluate and select research proposals in alignment with
the research strategy and organisational objectives. The
team envisaged the research streams being linked, with
data from the operational research being used to inform
real-time decision making.
By the end of year 2, two rounds of standalone, short-
term (6–12month) research projects had received fund-
ing and two operational research projects had been set
up during deployments to outbreaks. Study investigators
came from the core team as well as academic staff from
the collaborating institutions and research studies
spanned disciplines and included multiple diseases. (De-
tails of UK-PHRST publications available at: https://
www.lshtm.ac.uk/research/centres-projects-groups/uk-
phrst#publications). Some examples of short-term re-
search projects conducted in the early stages included;
developing a rapid review methodology for clinical re-
search to identify research gaps quickly in an outbreak;
examining the quality of clinical characterization in refu-
gee camps in Greece as a component of outbreak detec-
tion and characterization; and an audit of the quality of
the Ebola data that was captured in West Africa. The
mental health component included a project which ex-
plored the train the trainers model in cognitive behav-
iour therapy for anxiety and depression amongst Ebola
treatment centre health workers.
While many observers praised the team for getting re-
search studies off the ground quickly, since primary re-
sponsibility for research lay with the universities and
operational response with PHE, several respondents also
felt that this separation was hindering greater integration
of research within responses.
“I think it’s great that the RST is probably the only
and the first initiative that really tries to give an
equal weight to research and the public health re-
sponse, which is fantastic. At the same time, the re-
sponsibilities have been split [between lead
institutions], which still keeps them a bit divided [...]
I think we should be aspiring towards greater inte-
gration of the research with the public health re-
sponse.” (Member of ASC)
In theory, all core team members were expected to
contribute to delivering on the triple mandate (re-
sponse, research and capacity building) and to play
each role of responder, researcher and trainer
throughout the short deployments and in ‘peacetime’
(when not on emergency deployments). In reality, how-
ever, managing implementation of the triple mandate by
individual team members was believed to be challenging.
It was accepted that outbreak response would take prece-
dence over the operational research programme, so re-
search continuity plans would be required, however they
were not yet drafted at the time of the research. These
plans were expected to define responsibilities of the wider
faculty at the host academic institutions for maintaining
research programmes whilst CDT members were
responding to outbreaks or conducting urgent research.
While approvals for setting up research projects in the
midst of an outbreak worked well, respondents did high-
light the challenges of conducting research during short-
lived outbreaks.
“In terms of applying for the funding, we didn't have
to apply for the Madagascar funding. We asked the
RST if there were funds available to do an
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emergency research project and there were, because
there are reserve funds for that. Getting the okay for
that was actually very quick, very easy, very simple.
That's what you need in an outbreak. You don't need
a lengthy, drawn-out process where you have to for-
mally apply for funding.[...] A major issue was
recruiting enough patients. Even though we managed
to get off the ground in two weeks, the outbreak was
winding down by the time we started.” (CDT
member)
Given that ODA funding needed to be spent on an an-
nual basis, research projects needed to be modest and
respondents reported particular difficulties navigating
approval processes including ODA justification, setting
up studies and maintaining staff contracts to fit within
these 6–12-month timeframes. While respondents re-
ferred to the development of a more long-term, multi-
disciplinary research strategy with rolling multi-year
workplans, as of Year 2 (2018), this had not yet been
elaborated and was highlighted as a gap.
“I was thinking that we would have something that
would say over the next four years, these are the five
big questions we want to answer, but maybe I'm be-
ing overly optimistic, maybe it is better to do it op-
portunistically.” (Member of ASC)
Research budgets were quite modest and always
understood to be insufficient to fund large-scale studies
with approximately £500,000 available per year. Annual
amounts needed to be flexible, depending on the de-
mand on the overall budget of the team’s response to
outbreaks, which was unpredictable. Around 15% of the
annual operational research budget was earmarked for
emergency research in the context of an outbreak,
with the remaining 85% expected to be spent on the
long-term research agenda. The scheme was expected
to fund pilot studies which could be continued or
scaled up using external funding, with the short-term
projects acting as the ‘spark’ needed to attract larger
investments in epidemic research and build collabora-
tions. However, at the time of data collection, some
academic observers were sceptical that this strategy
would be effective.
“I think the short-term projects are, by definition,
they’re not sustainable [...] one of the ideas was that
the research activities would be sustained by getting
supplementary funding from other sources. That’s
easier to do if you’ve got demonstrated achievements
in a sizeable project that’s complex enough, that
there’s multiple secondary research activities.”
(Member of academic consortium)
Acquiring external funding to support the research
portfolio was perceived to require additional team in-
vestment in building partnerships in host countries and
sourcing funding. Generating and applying evidence
through operational research was described by one SMT
member as a route to catalysing policy change:
“I’m really all about evidence-based ways of doing
things. Then, it gives you a strong platform for policy
change.”
However, respondents felt that the work required to
ensure that evidence could be disseminated effectively
and translated into policy and practice had been under-
estimated in the initial years of the team’s work, particu-
larly the investment required to work on this with local
actors and implementers on the ground.
“Any research has to have a strong local engagement,
a capacity development component, adequate recog-
nition, very assiduous care about intellectual prop-
erty, data ownership and sharing, sample ownership
and sharing.” (Member of ASC)
Capacity building for outbreak response
The third component of the UK-PHRST mission was
training and capacity-building in LMICs to enable coun-
tries to respond effectively without international support.
A key goal stated in the strategy was “to ultimately elim-
inate the need for its existence”, however at the time of
the research this was the least evolved components of
the mandate with a lack of clarity on the priorities and
strategies for implementation. The following quote of an
SMT member demonstrated the aspirational and long-
term vision of the UK-PHRST to develop sustainable hu-
man resource capacities and build national response
mechanisms in LMICs.
“We want to have it [a situation] 20 years from now
where people would say, "Well, why the hell would
you have the UK respond to an outbreak in Africa?
They have that capacity." We want to help build
that capacity.”
Capacity building was conceptualised as a continuous
process required throughout an outbreak response
where international staff work side-by-side with national
responders to develop their skills and capacities. Provid-
ing technical advice and on-the-job mentorship to na-
tional responders was a large part of the work of
international responders when on deployment. Never-
theless, it was recognised by team members that there
was a limit to the capacity building they could do in the
short-term deployments and that building more long-
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term systems was the role of WHO, which has a long-
term presence at country level in many LMIC’s.
“We worked on the emergency surveillance system in
Sierra Leone. My previous team were there for two
weeks, I was there for five weeks. What you see is a
mass of holes in the normal surveillance system. I
can be there for two months or five months or ten
months and I'm not going to fix that. It takes years
and that's what WHO is for.” (CDT member)
At the time of data collection, a key strategy of the
UK-PHRST was to establish regional hubs for research
and capacity-building internationally, the first of which
was planned in Sierra Leone and would build on the
connections developed by PHE and the universities dur-
ing the Ebola outbreak. The overseas sites were expected
to provide a platform for capacity building and enable
the development of regional hubs for teaching and re-
search [44]. A number of scholarships for short courses
and Masters in Public Health were offered to individuals
in Sierra Leone and other LMICs through the UK-PHRS
T academic institutions and members of the team occa-
sionally lectured at universities in Sierra Leone. Team
members were also expected to spend large parts of
their time operating out of these hubs. In practice, how-
ever, members of the deployable team felt that being
based in LMIC’s would create challenges for other as-
pects of their mandate and would compromise team co-
hesion [48].
“I don't want to be based permanently somewhere
else. Partly because part of the strength is having the
school around you[...] I think if we're going to have a
team you actually have to have your team based
somewhere. If you base your nine people, three here
and three there and three there, then they're not a
team anymore, you can't really function as a team.”
(CDT member)
Since this research was undertaken, this strategy had
been abandoned and the concept of regional hubs is no
longer being pursued.
The UK-PHRST strategy also involved an element of
UK domestic capacity-building to amplify their expertise
through training a cadre of ‘reservists’ intended to ex-
pand the capability within the UK to rapidly scale-up re-
sponses to larger outbreaks and epidemics. Reservists
and members of the UK field epidemiology training
programme (FETP) were expected to be trained to UK-
PHRST standards and protocols and available to deploy
when necessary while retaining their routine “day jobs”.
The aim was to deploy reservists at least once every 2
years to maintain their skills and to build their
experience, as well as to ensure their continued interest
and engagement. In addition, the UK-PHRST sought to
play a leading role with WHO and GOARN in develop-
ing standardised trainings for international response
teams.
Discussion
The UK-PHRST was established in 2016 in the wake of
the Ebola epidemic, to address one of the global health
community’s most critical challenges, integrating oper-
ational research and capacity-building with rapid out-
break response. We describe the design, creation and
evolution of the UK-PHRST within the UK and global
health policy context since its establishment post-Ebola,
and report qualitative reflections on the challenges, suc-
cesses and lessons learned as they implemented the
complex triple mandate. While our findings are specific
to the UK context and the ways in which the UK con-
ceptualises their role in the global health architecture,
this case study could offer insights on the process of de-
signing and establishing such organisations in other
countries, which we outline below and discuss in rela-
tion to the current COVID-19 pandemic.
Designing and implementing the UK’s integrated and
innovative model
Conceptualised by public health actors in the UK who
were intimately involved in addressing the challenges
presented by the West African Ebola epidemic, the UK-
PHRST combined expertise from the government and
academic sectors to address the need for rapid outbreak
response, supported by an integrated research approach.
The unique triple mandate assigned to them established
the UK team as innovative in the global epidemic re-
sponse architecture but involved many domestic, inter-
national and institutional governance challenges which
they faced in the inception period. To our knowledge, in
this evolving and expanding sector, the UK-PHRST re-
mains the only team globally to systematically prioritise
and integrate operational research alongside rapid re-
sponse to outbreaks, reflecting a long tradition of
evidence-based policy-making in the UK. This organisa-
tional model provides an example that could be adapted
by other governments seeking to establish similar mech-
anisms. Demonstrating their successes and achieve-
ments, alongside descriptions of how they solved
structural challenges, may even drive establishment of
such teams at a local level in LMICs, particularly in Af-
rica where more than 150 public health emergencies
occur each year [49, 50].
The UK-PHRST had to reflect, course-correct and
evolve in their early days. The process of establishing the
partnership, for example, was beset by unanticipated
bureaucratic delays reflecting the challenges of
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establishing a government-academic partnership, while
also choosing ways of working which capitalised on each
institution’s strengths and fitted the UK Government’s
approach to overseas assistance. The initial vision of the
UK-PHRST emphasised equal power dynamics between
lead organisations and a commitment to operating as
one cohesive team. Despite this, both funding and gov-
ernance structures were separated across the two main
organisations. Reporting requirements were perceived by
many team members to be cumbersome and complex
with annual financial disbursements described as inflex-
ible and restrictive especially for research, causing poten-
tial tensions between the two lead organisations. Some
even suggested that a subcontract between PHE and
LSHTM would have been more efficient, given the
power dynamics in reality, which leveraged PHE’s exist-
ing fit within government structures. Regardless, it was
clear that the rationale behind this separation was to
maintain the ethos of institutional balance between orga-
nisations, as defined during conceptualisation of the
partnership.
In exploring the genesis and evolution of the UK-
PHRST, it was evident that the team’s mandate to con-
duct research was important in helping garner high-level
support for its creation. The policy idea of ‘evidence’,
and that investments in public programmes should con-
tribute to generating evidence, was appealing to
decision-makers in the UK context and to UK institu-
tions. The restrictive format of how ODA funding needs
to be disbursed and accounted for in the UK, however,
structured implementation in a way that sometimes con-
strained the team’s collaborative working and long-term
planning. The story of the UK-PHRST is therefore one
about how the appeal of evidence influences political
and financial decision-making, but also of how political
and financial structures in turn influence the evidence
that can be produced.
While integrating the three objectives was key to the
collaborative advantage and innovative role of the UK-
PHRST, in reality, implementing the triple mandate has
been challenging, as core team members straddle the
roles of responder, researcher and trainer [48]. The re-
search and capacity-building components required
greater facilitation through multidisciplinary collabora-
tions, partnering with institutions in the host countries
and a high level of contingency planning to ensure re-
search continued when team members were on deploy-
ment. Moreover, capacity building priorities and
strategies were not well elaborated in the initial stages,
reflecting the need to prioritise deployments and re-
search activities [51] and the decision to abandon the
strategy of regional hubs may have been influenced by
the demand which the triple mandate placed on team
members.
The role of the UK-PHRST in rapid outbreak response
Experience shows that a rapid response to infectious dis-
ease outbreaks can stop transmission, preventing minor
outbreaks from becoming major epidemics. However, an
important limiting factor for outbreak control in LMICs
is having a skilled workforce with the required expertise
in public health, epidemiology, clinical management, la-
boratory skills, social sciences and other relevant disci-
plines [28] and maintaining a functional roster of trained
staff available to deploy [3]. The UK-PHRST considered
their primary strength to be their model as a standing,
small team of multi-disciplinary experts able to deploy
early in the response preventing outbreaks from spiral-
ling out of control. Remaining within this remit was
considered important for the team to demonstrate their
added value within the broader global health architec-
ture, providing short-term, immediate support, while
GOARN coordinates the longer-term deployments,
which often involves recruitment of experts with existing
employment commitments. Emphasising the importance
of this, a recent review of national public health RRT’s
management highlighted several challenges in the devel-
opment and maintenance of an RRT roster to ensure de-
ployable surge staff were selected, available to deploy,
trained and had the relevant competencies to be effective
in the field [3].
Team members’ perceptions of their impact also
depended on the mode of their deployment. Bilateral de-
ployments were preferred by some team members as
they seemed to enable more effective implementation of
the triple mandate by allowing more autonomy to set up
research projects and to build relationships with aca-
demic groups on the ground, as well as closer working
relationships with national response staff. However, the
team’s leadership ultimately prioritised reinforcing and
positively influencing the existing global architecture for
outbreak preparedness and response by working closely
with WHO, GOARN and stakeholders and governments
in affected countries. Understandably, this created ten-
sion between visibility and recognition as the UK-PHRS
T versus alignment with the WHO-led response, which
was also highlighted by a recent mid-term evaluation of
the UK-PHRST [51]. In future, such relationships with
existing global and national institutions will likely be in-
strumental in amplifying the impact of the UK’s invest-
ment and the ability of the UK-PHRST to translate their
expertise and the evidence they generate into policy and
practice.
Epidemic preparedness efforts to date have largely fo-
cussed on the model of high-income countries support-
ing LMICs where most infectious disease outbreaks
happen, and this is the model which the UK-PHRST also
adopted. However, the COVID-19 pandemic is challen-
ging this model as response mechanisms of even the
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wealthiest countries, including the UK, have been over-
whelmed. The ability and willingness of high-income
countries to support LMICs in the COVID-19 pandemic
has been severely curtailed by overburdened health sys-
tems in high-income countries and enforcement of
international travel restrictions [7]. In the early stages of
the pandemic, for example, following requests from
WHO, Africa CDC, and national governments, the UK-
PHRST deployed team members to the Philippines,
Nepal, Ethiopia, Bangladesh and Nigeria but subsequent
travel restrictions forced the UK Government to recall
team members. Moreover, despite the efforts of the UK-
PHRST to identify and train a large pool of reservists to
serve in epidemic response, the need for these reservists
to work in their day jobs largely prevented their deploy-
ment. During the West African Ebola epidemic too, al-
though global and UK institutions made unprecedented
efforts to mobilise and second their staff, policies such
as flight bans and quarantines threatened to undermine
response efforts [13]. While UK-PHRST members con-
tinued to provide remote COVID-19 support in Africa
and Asia, the effectiveness of remote support at country
level is understandably limited and building local cap-
acity for outbreak response in LMICs remains the most
effective and sustainable model.
The importance of conducting operational research in
outbreaks
A fundamental lesson from the West Africa Ebola out-
break was the critical need for scientific evidence that
can only be generated by conducting research during the
response [52]. The COVID-19 pandemic has vastly in-
creased momentum and improved coordination in the
field of R&D compared to previous epidemics [7, 53, 54].
Through the Access to COVID-19 Tools Acceler-
ator (ACT-Accelerator), WHO have strongly advocated
for global coordination and collaboration to harness re-
search investments into global solutions while ensuring
equity of access [55]. Moreover, while research on epi-
demic response has historically tended to take a narrow
biomedical approach dominated by epidemiologists, cli-
nicians and microbiologists, the COVID-19 pandemic
has shone a light on the complexity of epidemics and
the importance of evidence-informed policy [6]. The
range of policies being implemented across different
countries reflect different needs for, and interpretation
of, available evidence in different political, social and
cultural contexts, highlighting the importance of political
and social science insights and contextually-adapted so-
lutions [6, 56]. Maintaining a multi-disciplinary em-
phasis in epidemic research plans of teams like the UK-
PHRST, which incorporates insights from anthropology,
political science, economics and other social science dis-
ciplines, would be important to inform real-time policy
decisions [1, 10, 12]. By example, the UK-PHRST are
well positioned to draw upon the broad expertise of the
academic partners involved in the partnership to elabor-
ate and implement a research strategy that can truly in-
form response efforts.
Our findings on the UK-PHRST demonstrate that es-
tablishing collaborative research partnerships in LMICs
and co-defining research priorities with partners on the
ground, can not only ensure the relevance of research
findings, but can also bridge the gaps between evidence
generation, policy and practice, a key objective of oper-
ational research [57]. Ensuring access to populations,
clinical specimens and public health data requires part-
nering with governments and local actors in host coun-
tries who may not prioritise research among other
competing health system challenges. For those establish-
ing teams like the UK-PHRST, we recommend pro-
actively engaging host governments, universities and
public health actors in priority countries to promote re-
search collaborations and facilitate dissemination and
translation of research findings [52, 57]. For the UK-
PHRST, the support of the three universities’ (LSHTM,
Oxford, KCL’s) overseas research sites meant that when
setting up projects they could draw upon pre-existing in-
frastructures and partnerships within the well-
established overseas networks of collaborators, a signifi-
cant opportunity and advantage of marrying the organi-
sations. For the UK-PHRST, ODA funding restrictions
had to be navigated and placed constraints on the part-
ners, impacting effective implementation of the research
strategy. For other RRT’s, building flexibility in the fund-
ing mechanism is an important lesson, and defining a
strategy that is aligned with global priorities [35] is likely
to encourage external funding commitments and build
sustainability of the research portfolio.
The UK-PHRST's contribution to building global health
security
In West Africa, it was estimated that the cost of the
Ebola crisis was three times higher than it would have
been to invest in preventative public health systems in
the affected countries [5, 58, 59]. General consensus that
the only fail-safe strategy for limiting the impact of epi-
demics, is building resilient health security systems in
every country, has been heavily reinforced by the
COVID-19 pandemic [1, 28, 60, 61]. The UK-PHRST
supports this aspiration by building outbreak response
capacity in LMICs and using operational research evi-
dence to inform context-specific policies and practice.
Major investments and significant progress has been
made since Ebola on strengthening global health secur-
ity, through the completion of JEE assessments in over
100 countries and subsequent development of national
action plans for health security by more than 60
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countries [61]. Since 2015, WHO’s Health Emergencies
Programme has developed and validated open access,
standardized RRT training material and has trained over
2,000 public health professionals [62]. In reality, however,
building strong health security systems in LMIC’s will
require addressing broader governance issues, including
implementation of the IHR core capacities, bolstering
leadership and management capabilities, and eliciting
commitment of governments to fund national health
security initiatives [33]. Under their present model, UK-
PHRST members recognised that it is not feasible for the
team to address all of these challenges, which requires
continuous in-country presence, contextual understanding
and strong relationships with government counterparts,
ultimately the role of WHO. Therefore, it is important
that they work closely with WHO country offices and
other UK programmes, including the PHE IHR strength-
ening projects, as well as other partners on the ground to
ensure their contribution is coordinated within national
action plans for health security.
Given their limited capacity coupled with the complex
mandate of the UK-PHRST it would be prudent to focus
capacity building efforts on their niche areas of expert-
ise, namely: i) developing and implementing a standar-
dised model for rapid response team training in LMICs,
ii) developing and delivering pre-deployment training
programmes for international responders with GOARN,
iii) capacity-building for operational research, including
training academics and students in LMICs to develop
and implement research protocols, set up clinical trials
and conduct observational studies, ensuring research can
be conducted and led by local investigators, and iv) of-
fering international educational opportunities in the UK
to strengthen public health workforces in LMICs. To-
gether these would ensure that they can optimally con-
tribute to an epidemic preparedness and response
workforce, building on demonstrated UK institutional
strengths, while avoiding duplication with WHO and
other partners.
Study limitations
Data for this study was collected early in the establish-
ment of the UK-PHRST, primarily during a period of
transition from the interim to a more permanent phase,
limiting the number of relevant staff available for inter-
view and introducing potential bias based on accessibil-
ity of interviewees. Only 19 people were interviewed out
of a much larger samples size, including the full UK-
PHRST team of 16 individuals, the ASC and multiple ex-
ternal stakeholders. Nevertheless, these respondents
were purposively sampled to get a broad range of per-
ceptions including members of the team from all four
institutions, the ASC and key external stakeholders
heavily involved in the design and/or implementation.
Some members of the team and several external stake-
holders were not included due to the limited scope and
timeframe of the study. Information was nevertheless tri-
angulated and validated to reduce bias and address gaps.
Conclusion
The importance of investing in global outbreak pre-
paredness and response capacity has never been more
apparent, as highlighted by the COVID-19 pandemic [6].
The 2013–16 Ebola outbreak drove establishment of the
UK-PHRST partnership at a time when political will for
global health reform was strong. The UK recognised that
rapid response by the international community to out-
breaks was insufficient and needed to be combined with
expansion of research capabilities and strengthened re-
sponse capacity in LMICs [49]. Many unanticipated
challenges emerged throughout the early stages of oper-
ations which the UK-PHRST had to navigate by develop-
ing, revising, abandoning or upholding key governance
decisions. While some were specific to the UK context,
others may be more generalisable and included: 1) struc-
turing the team as a government-academic collaboration
which built on long-term UK investments in public
health and the higher education sector and leveraged the
complementary knowledge, relationships and infrastruc-
ture available within partner institutions; 2) maintaining
the ethos of institutional balance between government
and academic organisations which required adopting a
more complex, dual reporting and funding structure; 3)
supporting a standing team available to rapidly respond
to outbreaks early, on request, preventing outbreaks
from spiralling out of control; 4) prioritising and funding
the research component both during outbreak response
and in “peacetime” to generate evidence that could influ-
ence policy and practices of existing and future epi-
demics; and 5) ensuring epidemic response and
capacity-building activities reinforced the existing
WHO-led global health security architecture.
The UK-PHRST aims to enhance global outbreak pre-
paredness and response using an innovative and inte-
grated model that capitalises on UK institutional
strengths. Our research suggests that despite adding
complexity, integrating operational research through the
government-academic collaboration contributed signifi-
cant advantages and remains a promising model for
responding to the ongoing global threat of epidemics.
This integrated model could be adopted and adapted by
countries seeking to build similar capacities.
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